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Abstract
Despite large potential gains, international equity investment is less diver-
sified across countries than predicted by the international version of the
traditional capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). This paper provides em-
pirical evidence on the impact of capital market frictions on international
equity portfolios using data on bilateral equity holdings. Two important
findings are reported: First, besides a home bias in equities, a ‘friendship
bias’ can be observed for some country pairs. Second, indirect barriers such
as the degree of financial market development and especially information
asymmetries have strong explanatory power, whereas direct barriers such
as capital flow restrictions have no impact on the portfolio share of foreign
equities.
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1 Introduction
Despite large potential gains, international equity investment is less diversified
across countries than predicted by the international version of the traditional
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
According to the ICAPM, individuals should hold equities from countries around
the world in proportion to their market capitalizations. However, empirical facts
reveal that international portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets.
This phenomenon − known as the ‘home bias puzzle’ − is one of the most striking
empirical results in international economics. Table 1 shows that in 2001 U.S.
investors held almost 90 percent of their portfolios in domestic equity compared
to a world market capitalization of U.S. equity of only 50 percent. For some
countries this bias is even more pronounced, for example 67.8 percent compared
to 3.9 percent for Germany and 85.9 percent compared to 1.25 percent for Spain.1
If one considers the European Monetary Unition (EMU) as one large financial
unit the home bias phenomenon is also very pronounced: Investors hold 80.9
percent whereas market capitalization of the euro area amounts to 15.2 percent.
This phenomenon has already attracted a large body of theoretical and empir-
ical research. Lewis (1995, 1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide extensive
reviews of the recent international economics and finance literature. However, the
puzzle is not yet fully explored. This is partly due to the lack of data on cross-
border holdings. Existing studies are either limited to U.S. foreign equity holdings
or focus on countries’ total foreign equity holdings not subdivided into country
pairs. This paper employs a recently available dataset on bilateral equity hold-
ings, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Bilateral equity holdings in 38 countries for two available
points in time, 1997 and 2001, are used as well as quantitative measures of direct
and indirect institutional barriers to international investment.
The aim of the paper is twofold: First, it gives a comprehensive insight into
bilateral equity holdings for a large cross section of 38 developed and emerging
economies. Second, the impact of capital market frictions on equity holdings is
studied. Direct barriers to investment include transaction costs such as capital
controls; indirect barriers are based on information asymmetries and the develop-
ment of financial markets. The paper provides new evidence on the relevance of
capital market frictions for equity holdings using a large cross section of country
pairs. Thereby it achieves to give some institutional explanations of the home
bias phenomenon.2
1For earlier years French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner
(1995) as well as Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) for the U.S. report similar levels of bias
towards home equity investment.
2As opposed to institutional explanations, individual investor behavior such as familiarity,
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This paper focuses on equity holdings in a bilateral sense. An important
assumption of the ICAPM theory is that there are no barriers to international
investment. Therefore, the theoretically predicted share of foreign assets at the
country level is calculated and compared to the actual share observed in the
data. The discrepancy between these two values is then taken to investigate
the relevance of different capital market frictions. The approach is based on the
one applied by Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and Edison and Warnock
(2004). This paper contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of the
home bias in equities to a large cross section of country pairs.
Many explanations of the extent of foreign equity shares and of the home bias
phenomenon have been discussed in the literature. Direct barriers are not able
to explain a great extent of the observed home bias. This reflects the fact that
more and more countries have abolished capital controls and other direct barriers
while significant indirect barriers to international investment remain (Karolyi and
Stulz 2003). In line with this literature, this paper finds that the existence of
capital controls has no impact on the share of foreign equity investment, which,
however, might be due to low data quality. Indirect barriers such as information
advantages measured by geographical proximity as well as by the existence of
a common legal origin or alternatively of a common colonial relationship have
great explanatory power: Coefficients are highly significant and large in size.
The paper shows that further indirect barriers such as the degree of financial
market development in the country of origin and in the country of destination
have a significant impact on the portfolio share of foreign equity investment as
well. Moreover, diversification considerations seem to be existent.
Section 2 theoretically discusses the relevance and measurement of capital
market frictions for the composition of international equity portfolios. Section 3
refers to the data used in the empirical approach and provides some descriptive
statistics of portfolio compositions across countries. Based on the insights of
Section 2, Section 4 outlines the empirical model. The results are presented in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Capital Market Frictions − Motivation and
Literature Overview
There are several reasons why it is useful to investigate the impact of capital
market frictions on the composition of international equity portfolios. First,
probability judgments and social identity have also been considered in the literature to explain
part of this phenomenon. The distinction between institutional and behavioral explanations
was first suggested by French and Poterba (1991).
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globalization in general is likely to lead to increased capital mobility and foreign
equity investments in order to exploit benefits.3 The identifiction of the rele-
vance of capital market frictions gives further insight into the future changes in
portfolios. Second, especially in the course of the ongoing integration process
in the European Union the portfolio composition is likely to change due to the
joining Eastern European countries. Third, given severe demographic changes
in many countries, especially in European countries and Japan, the direction of
capital flows will change. It is crucial for the estimation and prediction of future
investments to know more about the effect of capital market frictions and the
extent of capital mobility.4 Simulation models predicting international capital
flows induced by population aging usually consider scenarios of perfect capital
mobility within different regions.5 Descriptive statistics in Section 3.2 indicate
that capital mobility within the EMU is very high compared to other regions.
Different models and empirical studies consider institutional capital market
frictions in order to explain some extent of the phenomenon of home bias in equity
holdings and the volume of international capital flows. This literature is reviewed
to derive measures of the capital market frictions hypotheses for the subsequent
empirical investigation. The most important aspect of frictions are information
asymmetries which are broadly discussed followed by a presentation of the rele-
vance of financial development and direct barriers such as capital controls.6
2.1 Information Asymmetries
Asymmetric information is regarded as a key factor in explaining the empirical
evidence on foreign asset holdings and international capital flows. Differences
in accounting standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory environments
across countries lead to information asymmetries between local and foreign in-
vestors. Foreign investors have to translate and interprete this information in
light of the relevant legal conventions and business culture which leads to addi-
tional costs.
There are some papers that indirectly provide evidence of the effect of infor-
mation asymmetries on equity investment. Gehrig (1993) models the effect of
asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors using a noisy ra-
3See Obstfeld (1995) on the benefits and measuring of international capital mobility.
4Lu¨hrmann (2003) estimates and predicts international capital flows induced by population
aging and takes account of several capital market frictions.
5See Bo¨rsch-Supan, Heiss, Ludwig and Winter (2003).
6Frictions caused by nontradable goods are not considered in this context as the impact
of the existance of nontradable goods on cross-border equity holdings is hardly empirically
measurable with our approach. Lewis (1999) tested implications of nontradable models based
on complete markets and showed that these models are not able to explain the home bias.
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tional expectations model. In his model investors observe noisy signals of firms’
returns with different degrees of precision. It is assumed that on average do-
mestic investors receive signals of future returns that are more precise. Even in
equilibrium, investors remain incompletely informed. Under these assumptions
a domestic bias arises. Based on the same noisy rational expectations approach
Brennan and Cao (1997) build a model of the impact of asymmetric informa-
tion between domestic and foreign investors on capital flows. They obtain some
empirically testable hypotheses on the relationship between returns on national
market indices and portfolio flows which are weakly supported by their data.
Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investment in Japanese equities is
concentrated in the largest firms as foreign investors have less information about
small firms than local investors. They create a model that reveals a home bias
in equities in the case of a higher return uncertainty with respect to the foreign
market. The implications of their model are consistent with asset allocations of
foreign stock ownerships in Japan.
There is a recently growing literature on measuring directly the impact of
information asymmetries on equity holdings and flows. Ahearne, Griever and
Warnock (2004) proxy information asymmetries by the fraction of public listings
of international company stocks at U.S. stock exchanges. Information barriers are
reduced as U.S.-listed equities have adopted U.S. accounting standards, disclosure
requirements and the U.S. regulatory requirements.7 In their cross-country study
they find a strong relationship between a country’s relative share of cross border
listings and the relative weight in U.S. equity portfolios. They conclude that
information asymmetry has a major impact on U.S. investors’ portfolios and
that it is more important than direct barriers to international investment such
as capital controls. At a security-level Edison and Warnock (2004) also find
that cross-listings at U.S. exchanges have a very strong impact on U.S. investors’
portfolio choices of foreign equity. Both empirical studies support the argument
that information costs play an important role in the equity investment decision
of U.S. investors.
In the economics literature Portes and Rey (2004), Ghosh and Wolf (2000),
and Di Giovanni (2004) use ‘gravity-models’ to explain cross-border capital flows
between countries.8 Martin and Rey (2004) construct a ‘gravity-model’ where
assets are imperfect substitutes and supply of assets is endogenous. They assume
7To publicly issue debt or list at U.S. stock exchanges, a foreign firm must reconcile its
accounts with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and subject itself to
the associated regulatory burden. The U.S. GAAP allow investors to compare companies more
easily across industries, irrespective of geography. Therefore this adopted measure reduces
information costs to U.S. investors.
8Portes and Rey (2004) investigate international equity flows, Di Giovanni (2004) cross bor-
der M&A activity and Ghosh and Wolf (2000) FDI, bank lending, portfolio debt and portfolio
equity.
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the existence of costs that capture transaction costs and information asymme-
tries between two countries, which are then proxied by geographical distance.
The model implies that gross bilateral asset flows will be greater the smaller
the distance. In addition to the distance variable, information frictions are also
captured by using variables measuring directly the degree of asymmetry between
domestic and foreign investors such as the volume of telephone traffic and the
number of bank branch subsidiaries, as well as an index of insider trading. For
a large cross-section of countries the geographical component in explaining the
volume and direction of international capital flows dominates.
Pointing into the same direction, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provide ev-
idence that there exists a preference for geographically proximate investments
even in U.S. investors’ portfolios of domestic equity. The importance of distance
has been referred to as the ‘distance puzzle’. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) ar-
gue that distance affects bilateral asset holdings9 mainly through its impact on
trade in goods. Once the impact of trade in goods on equity holdings is taken
into account, distance is not very important anymore as an explaining factor for
equity holdings. The open question, why asset portfolios are induced by trade in
goods, has not yet been fully solved by economic theory so far.
Information advantages do not only arise due to geographical proximity but
also due to similar institutions and legal structures. Legal rights of investors
differ very much across countries. A large part of this variation is accounted
for by legal origin. This applies especially to commercial laws for the financing
of firms and for investment but also to law enforcement (La Porta, de Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishney 1997, 1998). Laws from different countries are typically not
written from scratch but rather transplanted – voluntarily or enforced – from a
few legal families or traditions. In general, commercial laws stem from two broad
traditions: common law and civil law. A proxy for reduced information asymme-
tries is the same legal origin of countries, where German, French, Scandinavian
civil law families, the English common law and the Socialist law family are dis-
tinguished. In a gravity model framework Vlachos (2004) investigates the effect
of regulatory harmonization. He provides evidence that bilateral differences in
securities regulation and investor protection have large effects on the integration
of securities markets.
The similarity of institutions can also be proxied by the fact that two coun-
tries share a common colonial background. Colonialism explains the building
of institutions for several, although not all, countries (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson 2002).10 Information advantages arise due to the similarity of institu-
9Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) employ stocks as opposed to flows.
10Acemoglu et al. (2002) explain income distribution across former colonies by the degree
of urbanization and population density: Sparsely populated countries or regions induced Euro-
peans to settle in large numbers and to develop institutions encouraging investment.
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tions between colony and colonizer.
The subsequent empirical investigation employs distance as a measure to
proxy the costs of obtaining information about foreign markets. Distance is
supposed to have a negative impact on foreign equity holdings. To account for
a reduction of information costs due to cultural proximity a dummy variable
for two countries that are member of the same legal family and alternatively a
dummy variable for two countries sharing a common language or a common colo-
nial background are considered. Both dummy variables are expected to have a
positive impact on portfolio shares of foreign equities.
2.2 Financial Market Development
Financial markets and financial intermediaries play an important role for domes-
tic as well as international investments by mobilizing savings, allocating credit,
and facilitating hedging, pooling and pricing of risks. In larger and more liquid
markets market prices are supposed to be more informative. One reason is that
larger markets encourage arbitrage through liquidity, the existence of more and
better substitutes to use as hedges for trading against mispriced securities and
reduced transaction costs.11 Common proxies for financial development such as
the size and depth of the domestic capital market are the amount of private credit
provided by the banking sector or the ratio of M2 to GDP.12
Efficient investment, and hence an efficient allocation of capital, not only de-
pends on the investors’ ability to distinguish promising investment opportunities
from mediocre ones. The protection of investor rights and the quality of the
legal environment of a country ensures that investors actually invest in the most
efficient opportunities. La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney (1998) pro-
vide evidence that investor protection and the quality of the legal environment
have large effects on the size and breadth of capital markets across 175 developed
and developing countries from 1960 to 1997. Most firms in countries with poor
investor protection are controlled by large shareholders, so that only a fraction
of the shares issued by firms in these countries can be freely traded and held
by investors. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that the
share of a country’s equities in the stock portfolio of U.S. investors is negatively
related to the share of the stock market capitalization of the country held by
large shareholders.
Following the literature, the amount of private credit provided by the banking
sector relative to GDP is employed in order to account for the development of
11See Beck, Demirgu¨k-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Wurgler (2000)
12See for example Edison and Warnock (2004), Portes and Rey (2004), Portes, Rey and Oh
(2001) Di Giovanni (2004) as well as Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004).
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the financial sector in the source country as well as the country of origin. It is
expected to have a positive impact on foreign equity holdings. As a proxy for
investor rights and the liquidity of the market the float portfolio calculated in
Dahlquist et al. (2003) is considered. The float portfolio is the market capital-
ization of a country exclusive of closely-held shares by controlling shareholders.
It is expected to have more explaining power for investors’ portfolio shares than
the usual market capitalization.
2.3 Direct Barriers
Information asymmetries and financial market development determine the in-
vestor’s decision in an indirect manner. Direct barriers such as capital controls
that have an immediate impact on the net investment return and therefore on
the investment decision are also considered.
Although in the 1990s, capital controls have been reduced to a great extent
they are still existent today. These controls encompass a wide range of different
and often country-specific measures on either capital inflows or outflows. The
crucial question is, whether controls that are in place are in fact effective.13 This
leads to difficulties in measuring the actual degree of investment restrictions for
a large cross section of countries. Most measures of capital controls that are
available for a large cross section of countries are based on the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and
do not or hardly take the effectiveness of capital controls into account.14
Overall, the recent literature suggests that direct capital market frictions are
not irrelevant but have only a minor impact compared to indirect frictions.15
Given the limited data availability on the intensity of capital controls for the
large set of countries in my sample, I use a financial openness measure that was
for the first time provided by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF’s
AREAER.16 This index is expected to have a negative impact on portfolio shares
both, for the country of origin as well as for the country of destination.
13For a detailed description of different types of capital controls and their effectiveness see
Edison et al. (2002) and Neely (1999); for different country experiences see Ariyoshi et al.
(2000).
14Although there have been attempts to determine measures of the effectiveness of capital
controls, these are only available for a limited number of countries or years. See, e.g., Edison
et al. (2002) for a comprehensive overview of capital control measures.
15See recent empirical results e.g. in Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and Di Giovanni
(2004). A more detailed discussion can be found in Karolyi and Stulz (2003).
16As an alternative to capital control measures, Bekaert, Campbell and Lumsdaine (2002)
determine liberalization dates for countries’ financial markets. Di Giovanni (2004) provides
evidence that liberalization dates for the source country indeed have a significant impact on
cross border M&A activity. However, in my sample no liberalizations take place.
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3 Data Description
3.1 Data
So far, reliable bilateral holdings data has hardly been available except for the
results of some smaller surveys of residents’ portfolio holdings such as for the
U.S. in 1994 and 1997.17 Cross country equity holdings are obtained from the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). For the first time this data set includes comparable portfolio holdings
data from as many countries around the world as possible. The survey has been
undertaken twice: a first wave in 1997 with 29 countries only and a second wave
in 2001 including 64 countries. Further waves are following in the near future.
The CPIS data refers to end of year numbers and includes amongst other
things information on gross bilateral foreign equity holdings, securities and for
some countries separately reported liabilities. Foreign equity holdings include
cross border investment from all sectors: monetary authorities, general gov-
ernment, banks and other financial intermediaries, nonprofit organizations, and
households.18 The IMF provides the definitions and concepts19 whereas the data
is organized by domestic statistical institutions, as each country should take ac-
count of its own particular financial structure and circumstances. The greatest
difficulty consists in capturing cross border investments by households. There
are some differences in reporting equity holdings for the 1997 and 2001 waves. In
1997 the distinction between unavailable and zero was not made. Therefore, the
two years are treated separatly for the estimations.
Information on countries’ total market capitalizations is taken from the World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2002) and the International Federation of Stock
Exchanges (FIBV).20 An alternative measure of market capitalizations, the liq-
uidity adjusted float portfolio, can be found in Dahlquist et al. (2003). Data on
GDP growth is obtained from WDI (2002).
In order to measure information frictions the physical distance between coun-
tries’ capital cities and alternatively the fact whether two countries share a com-
mon border is used. Moreover, a dummy variable is added that is equal to one if
17This data has been used for an analysis of the home bias in equities phenomenon for U.S.
investors by Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004). The 1997 data is also part of the CPIS, as
national agencies are asked to provide the bilateral holdings data.
18Note that equity investment that establishes a direct investment relationship is excluded
from the CPIS. See the definition in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition
(BPM5) and the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide.
19These have to be in conformity with the BPM5.
20The availability of stock market measures limits the amount of countries in our sample to
38.
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two countries share a common language or have a common colonial background.
All these data are based on the CIA factbook21 and obtained from Frankel, Stein
and Wei (1995). A dummy variable is included to account for if two countries be-
long to the same legal familiy. This data is obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).
To measure the degree of financial market development the amount of domestic
credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP is used. This measure is
obtained from WDI (2002).
Capital controls are taken account of by using an updated index by Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The capital control data refers
to the home country as well as to the country of destination. Unfortunately,
the data does not allow a clear separation of restrictions on inflows or outflows.
Thus, the same indicator, restricti,t and restrictj,t respectively, is included for
both countries.
In 1997 as well as in 2000/01 there have been several banking crises such as
for example in Thailand, Malaysia and Turkey. This is taken into account by a
dummy variable that is equal to one if a banking crisis as documented in Caprio
and Klingebiel (2003) exists in the relevant or precedent year.
Stock returns are considered using standard national stock market indices
by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).22 In order to proxy investors’
diversification motives monthly returns lagged by one quarter are used to calcu-
late return correlations between two countries and historical risk adjusted excess
returns.
The regional classification of the countries is shown in Table 3. It is based on
the UN geographical region division and used to construct region dummies.23
Appendix C includes a table with all variables and detailled descriptions of
their sources and exact calculations. In Table 5 descriptive statistics of all vari-
ables are summarized.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
For all countries around the world with existing stock markets a home bias in
equities with respect to total home versus foreign investment can be observed.
Table 1 presents the magnitude of this home bias for some selected countries. In
addition, there exists a home bias at the country pair level for most cases indi-
cating that investors hold - compared to the International Capital Asset Pricing
21See www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
22For all available countries I use the gross index including dividend payments in U.S. dollars.
23See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49region.htm.
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Model (ICAPM) - too little of their portfolio in foreign equities of a given country.
Table 2 presents bilateral equity portfolio shares for selected countries (France,
Germany, Japan, UK, the U.S. and EMU). For the U.S. this bilateral equity
home bias is existent for all country pairs and has been amply discussed in the
literature. In contrast, one can observe a bilateral ‘friendship bias’ for some other
country pairs. This bilateral ‘friendship bias’ states that more than the portfolio
share predicted by the ICAPM is held. The phenomenon applies especially to
a number of country pairs within the EMU where capital market integration is
very advanced.
4 Empirical Model and Estimation
The empirical approach is based on the idea of comparing the portfolio share
of foreign equities predicted by the International Capital Asset Pricing Model
(ICAPM) based on the assumption of perfectly integrated capital markets to
the empirical share in a world with capital market frictions. The discrepancy
between these two measures is then explained by direct and indirect barriers to
international investment at the country-level.24
In order to derive an empirical model two different classes of theoretical capital
asset pricing models are considered: first, the ICAPM without capital market
frictions and, second, an ICAPM with barriers to international investment.25
The first class of models goes back to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). The
traditional version of the ICAPM is built on the assumption that investment
and consumption opportunity sets do not differ across countries. Investors are
the same across countries with respect to risk-aversion and information. These
models assume perfect markets. The fact that countries use different currencies
has no significant impliciations for portfolio choice and asset pricing. There are
no taxes, no tariffs, no information asymmetries, no restrictions on short-sales
and no barriers to international investment. One convenient property of this
traditional version of the CAPM is that it has simple and clear implications for
investors’ asset holdings: Investors hold the world market portfolio of risky assets
irrespective of their country of residence i. It follows that the portfolio share of
country i invested into country j, W ∗j , can be expressed as:
24It is not explicitly taken account of behavioral frictions such as familiarity, individual prob-
ability judgments or social identity. At the aggregated country-level, behavioral familiarity
effects can hardly be separated from indirect institutional barriers such as information asym-
metries, both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view.
25See Stulz (1995) for a detailed review of the capital asset pricing literature and a systematic
discussion of different models.
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W ∗j,t =
MCAPj,t
MCAPworld,t
,∀i,
where MCAPj,t denotes market capitalization of country j and MCAPworld,t
world market capitalization in period t. This market portfolio share serves as the
benchmark case of portfolio holdings to which the actual portfolio share that can
be observed in the data is compared.
The second class of models by Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Merton (1987) and
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) relaxes the assumption of perfect markets.26 These
models include frictions that are typically modelled as a deadweight cost or a
tax on expected returns in the foreign country.27 Investment costs are proxied by
indicators of capital market frictions as discussed in Section 2.
Given the two classes of models, the following relationship between observed
portfolio shares, W actij,t , and the market portfolio share, W
∗
j,t, is considered:
28
W actij,t = α0,t + α1,tW
∗
j,t + C
′
i,tβ1,t + C
′
j,tβ2,t + C
′
ij,tβ3,t + Zij,tγt + ²ij,t.
The optimal share of investment in the ICAPM with perfect markets, W ∗j,t,
enters the right hand side. If the empirical model is able to account for all capital
market frictions α1 should be equal to one. As discussed in Section 2.2, a liquidity
adjusted measure of the stock market capitalization of the destination country,
W floatj,t , instead of W
∗
j,t is considered in some specifications.
Ci,t, Cj,t and Cij,t are vectors of indicators for capital market frictions with
respect to the country of origin i, the country of destination j or the country pair
ij.29 These vectors consist of variables that take account of information frictions,
financial development and direct barriers to investment. The following variables
are included to capture information frictions: (1) the logarithm of distance be-
tween country i and country j, logdistanceij,t, (2) a dummy variable equal to
one if a country pair has a common legal origin, samelegorij,t. Next, variables
26Besides explicitly modelling investment barriers, deviations from the optimal portfolios in
the case of the traditional ICAPM mentioned above can arise due to deviations from purchasing
power parity such as in the model by Adler and Dumas (1981). However, Cooper and Kaplanis
(1994) show empirically that large parts of the home bias in equity puzzle cannot be explained
by this model
27Empirical tests of this class of models have been undertaken in an indirect way so far,
see for example Cooper and Kaplanis (1994). Stulz (1995) provides a comprehensive review
of emprical tests of ICAPM models with capital market frictions. As opposed to indirect
approaches, I address the impact of capital market frictions on portfolio choice directly.
28For the exact calculation of actual portfolio shares see Appendix A.
29Country of origin denotes the investor’s country of residence.
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reflecting the degree of financial market development are included: (3) the loga-
rithm of domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP
for the country of origin as well as for the country of destination, logdcrediti,t
and logdcreditj,t. Direct barriers are added: (4) an index of capital flow restric-
tions both for the country of origin and the country of destination, restricti,t and
restrictj,t. Consequently, frictions such as financial market underdevelopment
and capital flow restrictions are attributed to each country separatly whereas
information frictions are country pair specific.30
In addition, a vector of control variables, Zij,t, is included in order to investi-
gate whether diversification motives lead to higher foreign portfolio shares. Two
different proxies are considered that capture different aspects of diversivication.
First, a reward-to-risk measure as constructed by Ahearne, Griever and Warnock
(2004) is calculated. This variable, hrarij,t, measures the mean monthly return
over its standard deviation. Second, investors are likely to exploit gains from
diversifying investments. A correlation variable that is equal to the monthly re-
turn correlation, is added, rcorrij,t. In order to control for profitable investment
opportunities in growing economies, GDP growth for the country of destination
is included, gdpgrowthj,t.
Additionally, I account for banking crises by considering a dummy equal to
one if a banking crisis was present in the current or antecedent year, crisisbanki,t,
crisisbankj,t. Fixed effects are included via regional dummies for the country of
destination and the country of origin. The regional assignment is documented in
Table 3. Finally, a constant, α0,t, and a nuisance term, ²ij,t, are included.
Capital market frictions are likely to have an impact on the perception of
expected return differences and return correlations. This effect is taken into
account in some specifications by including interactions between indicators for
capital market frictions and historical risk adjusted return differences, hrarij,t,
and return correlations, rcorrij,t. In addition, the hypothesis is tested whether
capital market frictions have a different impact in a sample with well integrated
markets such as the EMU.
In several cases reported investments are zero. These corner solution outcomes
are likely due to an investor’s optimization in a world with investment barriers
that results in an optimal outcome of zero foreign equity holdings. Consequently,
W actij,t is zero. For all other observations the dependent variable is positive and
continuous. Therefore, a corner solution model is estimated, where the partial
effects of W ∗j,t, Ci,t, Cj,t and Cij,t on E(W
act
ij,t |W
∗
j,t, Ci,t, Cj,t, Cij,t) are of interest.
These are obtained by estimating a Tobit model censored at zero and by calcu-
lating average adjustment factors for the coefficients of the Tobit regression.31
30For more detailed descriptions of the explaining variables refer to Appendix B.
31See Wooldridge (2002), Chap. 16 pp. 521-524 for exact derivations.
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This estimation method can be applied to the CPIS data for 2001, but not
immediately to the 1997 wave, because in 1997 zeros refer to both true zeros and
missing values. In order to provide comparability across regressions for each year
and to validate a Tobit estimation approach for the 1997 data, missing values are
imputed by using the information of the 2001 wave: A Probit model fitting the
probability of a missing or a zero entry given the explaining variables mentioned
above is estimated for 2001. The estimation output is reported in Table 4. The
estimated coefficients are used to estimate the probability of a zero or missing
value for 1997. If the probability of a missing is larger than one half, the reported
zero is changed into a missing value.
5 Results
Basic regression results are reported in Tables 6 to 9. Additional robustness
checks can be found in Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of all variables are
summarized in Table 5.
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 6 summarize basic regression results for
1997 and 2001. Information frictions proxied by logdistanceij,t and samelegorij,t
have highly significant, large coefficients with the expected negative and positive
signs. A one percent increase in distance between two countries leads on average
to a decrease in the portfolio share of equity holdings of about 0.15 in 1997
and of about 0.27 in 2001, which is the coefficient times the reported average
adjustment factor resulting from the Tobit model. If both countries have the
same legal origin, the share of foreign equity holdings is on average 0.25 higher
in 1997 and even larger in 2001, namely equal to 0.39. This is a very substantial
difference to countries not sharing a common legal origin, given that the average
value of W actij,t is 0.36 in 1997 and 0.7 in 2001 (Table 5).
32
Geographical proximity and historical relations facilitate the knowledge of ac-
counting practices, corporate culture, political events, and the structure of asset
markets and their institutions. Moreover, cultural exchange and cultural affinities
are a component of the network effects that influence international economic in-
teractions. Overall, the results emphasize the importance of information frictions
as determinants of international equity portfolios.
The second group of indirect capital market frictions refers to the degree of
financial market development in the source country as well as in the country of
32Robustness checks in Appendix B reveal that instead of using common legal origin as a
proxy for information advantages, the fact that two countries share a common language (which
is identical to saying that two countries share a common colonial background in our sample)
leads to the same strong results. Likewise distanceij,t can be interchanged with a dummy
variable equal to one if two countries are part of the same region.
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destination, proxied by the corresponding ratios of private credit provided by
the financial sector relative to GDP, logdcrediti,t and logdcreditj,t. For 1997 the
coefficients on both variables are significant and have the expected positive signs.
The effect is larger for the country of destination: A one percent increase in the
home country’s credit to GDP ratio leads to an average increase in the share of
foreign equity holdings of 0.17 whereas a one percent increase in the country of
destination leads on average to additional 0.22 percentage points of foreign equity
holdings of country i in country j. In 2001 this effect is slightly larger whereas
the home country effect is not significant.
The more developed the financial sector of the foreign country j, the more
informative are prices and investment opportunities. Investors are more inclined
to hold equity shares in that economy. The positive effect of the financial market
development in the home country i indicates that more and better financial insti-
tutions not only lead to more local financial activity but also to more investments
in foreign markets.
If capital controls on incoming capital are in place, the share of foreign equity
investment into that country should be lower. Again a negative effect is expected
if capital controls on outgoing capital are in place. Neither of these effects is
significant in 1997 or 2001. But one has to bear in mind the imprecise quality of
the capital control data and the problem of measuring the effectiveness of capital
controls.
Control variables are added in order to check further hypotheses. First, there
is a tendency to follow higher risk adjusted excess returns in 1997. For 2001
the coefficient is significant but does not reveal a positive sign (Table 6). Once
interaction effects are held constant in the 2001 sample [specification (3)], the
coefficient on historical risk adjusted return differences, hrarij,t, is highly signifi-
cant and has a positive coefficient.33 Interactions with frictions such as financial
market development in the source country, same legal origin and GDP growth
in the foreign country reveal significant effects on foreign portfolio shares. The
coefficients on hrar ∗ logdcreditj,t and hrar ∗ samelegorij,t are negative which in-
dicates that investors care less about higher risk adjusted excess returns in high
developed source markets and markets with similar institutions.34 Overall, for
both years diversification motives can be identified although results are not very
stable across years and specifications.
Second, return correlations, captured by the variable rcorrij,t, have no signif-
33However, for 1997 the significant impact of risk adjusted return differences, hrarij,t vanishes
if interactions are taken into account; interactions are not significant. All other coefficients do
not change.
34Moreover, if GDP growth rates are higher, positive risk adjusted excess returns and negative
return correlations have larger impacts on foreign portfolio shares. With respect to distance
the two interaction effects have ambigious interpretations.
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icant effect.35 Third, GDP growth is included as an additional control variable
for the country of destination. It has a significantly positive impact in 2001 only:
A one percent increase in GDP growth leads to an increase in foreign equity
holdings of about 0.075 percent.
Common to the above mentioned specifications is the fact that the coefficient
ofW ∗j,t is highly significant but very low in size, namely equal to 0.05 for 1997 and
0.08 in 2001. The effect of the float portfolio share, W floatj,t , is slightly smaller for
both years. In the full sample the float portfolio share does not seem to capture
any further liquidity effects and does not provide any additional explaining power
compared to the market portfolio share,W ∗j,t.
36 These results show that for a large
cross section of countries the implications of the traditional ICAPM are hardly
existent. – Does this change when the impact of W ∗j,t on W
act
ij,t is analyzed for
different regions and countries separately?
The size of the coefficients ofW ∗j,t andW
float
j,t indeed differs significantly across
regions. Table 7 presents regressions including region dummies interacted with
the market and the float portfolio share respectively. Compared to the reference
region Western Europe the partial effects of the market portfolio share are sig-
nificantly larger for North America and Northern Europe. For Southern Amer-
ica, East Asia, South East Asia and West Asia partial effects are significantly
smaller.37 The same picture corresponds to the float portfolio share. Except for
Nothern America the results are similar for both years. The largest coefficient
can be observed in the 2001 sample for Nothern Europe: A one percent increase
in the market capitalization of the source country leads to a in increase in actual
foreign portfolio shares by 0.19.38
When the two measures of market capitalization are interacted with dummies
for the U.S. as a source country and with a dummy for country pairs within the
EMU the coefficients of W ∗j,t and W
float
j,t become even larger. For EMU country
pairs the effect of W floatj,t is more than three times as large as for the rest of the
sample in 2001 (Table 8). There is no significant difference in coefficients for the
U.S.
Interestingly, for within-EMU investments the coefficient on W floatj,t is larger
than the coefficient on W ∗j,t. This can be observed for the full sample estimations
in Table 8 and for a sample refering to within-EMU investments only (Table 9).
35The tendency to find a positive relationship in 2001 is in line with other empirical studies,
e.g. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004).
36If both variables are included at the same time, the coefficient on W floatj,t is insignificant.
37The regional classification is documented in Table 3.
38Note that partial effects with respect to the full sample, i.e. zero and positive values, are
described here. If partial effects for the sample with positive foreign portfolio shares are of
interest the marginal impacts of W ∗j,t and W
float
j,t are almost twice as large.
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Within the EMU an increase in W ∗j,t by one percentage point leads in 1997 to an
increase in the portfolio share by 27 percentage points whereas a similar increase
in W floatj,t leads to a portfolio share that is 34 percentage points higher (Table 9).
For 2001 the average partial effects are 51 and 67 percentage points respectively.39
If one limits this interpretation to partial effects of positive observed portfolio
shares the hypothesis of W ∗j,t being equal to one can not be rejected for the 2001
sample. The results show that in a well integrated market such as this sub-sample
of within-EMU investments the world market portfolio and the float portfolio
share have a very large effect on actual portfolio shares and the implication of
the traditional ICAPM comes out very well.
For the sample of within EMU investments only, information frictions are
still existent but only with respect to distance. The degree of financial market
development of the source country matters only for 1997 but not any more for
2001. Financial market development of the home country does not matter in 1997
whereas in 2001 it has a significant and large negative impact as opposed to the
positive coefficients in the full sample estimations. This could be due to the fact
that highly developed financial markets have better diversification possibilities
within their own countries and are therefore less inclined to hold foreign equities.
This effect might dominate in a sample of relative homogeneous financial markets
and lead to a negative coefficient. Finally, diversification motives are present but
not stable across years.
6 Conclusion
This paper employs a recently available data set, the IMF’s Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey, in order to investigate the institutional determinants of
international equity portfolios. The large cross section of the data itself allows to
report some interesting facts about international bilateral equity holdings: While
a home bias in equities can be observed for most country pairs including the
U.S., the data reveals a bilateral ‘friendship bias’ for several other country pairs,
mostly countries within the same geographical region, in particular within the
EMU.
The aim of the paper is to provide evidence on the impact of capital market
frictions on foreign equity holdings. The corresponding empirical hypotheses are
derived from the finance and international economics literature. Direct capital
market frictions include capital controls while indirect barriers encompass infor-
mation asymmetries and the degree of financial market development. Capital
39Similarly, for the U.S. Dahlquist et al. (2003) show that the coefficient on W floatj,t is larger
than on W ∗j,t.
16
market frictions altogether are expected to contribute to a lower portfolio share
in overall foreign equities. The empirical model is based on the difference between
actual equity portfolio shares and the ones predicted by the ICAPM under the
assumption of perfect capital markets.
The estimation results reveal that especially information asymmetries, proxied
by geographical proximity and the existence of a common legal origin or, alterna-
tively, by the existence of a common language or a common colonial background,
have very large and significant impacts on the composition of international equity
portfolios. Financial development measured as the amount of credit provided by
the banking sector relative to GDP also has large positive effects on the share of
bilateral equity portfolios. This is true for the country of destination as well as for
the country of origin. The impact of financial market development is, however,
less important, i.e. smaller and less significant, across specifications compared to
the impact of information advantages.
By contrast, capital controls do not play any role in determining equity portfo-
lios. A similar result has been emphasized also by Ahearne, Griever and Warnock
(2004). However, in this paper these results might be partly due to the relatively
low quality of the capital controls data.
In addition, diversification considerations of investors and their relations to
capital market frictions are investigated. Higher risk adjusted excess returns have
a positive impact on foreign portfolio shares in several specifications. In some
cases this is revealed only after controlling for interactions between capital market
frictions and excess returns. Diversification considerations reflected by negative
return correlations can hardly be found in the data.
Liquidity constraints due to controlling shareholders, i.e. the availability of
shares issued by firms in a country, are taken into account by using an alternative
float portfolio instead of the market portfolio share as an explaining variable.
However, for the full sample there are no significant differences between these
two measures. For within-EMU investments the coefficient of the float portfolio
has additional explaining power.
The sample consists of 38 countries and includes about 1800 observations on
bilateral equity portfolio shares for two years, 1997 and 2001. Robustness checks
suggest that the main results are very stable for different subsamples exclud-
ing major financial centers as well as for different specifications and estimation
techniques. Years are estimated separately due to reporting changes. There are
differences mostly with respect to the size of the coefficients across the two years.
However, the main conclusions apply to both subsamples.
The results in this paper reveal a strong impact of indirect capital market
frictions on international equity holdings and therefore go part of the way in
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explaining the home bias in equity phenomenon and the ‘friendship bias’ that is
documented for some country pairs. The geographical patterns in international
equity portfolios and the importance of information asymmetries established in
this paper are similar to the results obtained by ‘gravity model’ approaches.
These findings suggest a more detailed look at the linkage between capital flows,
equity holdings and diversification. Besides, further research is needed to base the
empirical evidence on a more sophisticated theoretical model that demonstrates
the impact of capital market frictions on international equity holdings in an
ICAPM framework taking into account diversification considerations of investors.
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Table 1: Home Bias in Equities in 2001 
% of equity assets share of world
 in domestic equities market capitalization
US 89.22 50.64
Japan 89.50 8.26
UK 74.73 8.13
Germany 67.81 3.93
France 79.80 4.31
Spain 85.94 1.25
EMU 80.93 15.19
Source: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS, market capitalizations from 
       WDI (2002) and FIBV, own calculations.   
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Table 2: Bilateral Equity Portfolio Shares of Selected Countries in 2001 
share of world 
countryj market capitalization France Germany Japan UK U.S. EMU
Argentina 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
Australia 1.37 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.54 0.26 0.15
Austria 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01
Belgium 0.06 0.57 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.06
Brazil 0.68 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.10
Canada* 2.57 0.10 -0.03 0.13 -0.34 0.62 0.09
Chile 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Colombia 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.35 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.07
Egypt 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.70 0.47 1.16 0.09 0.48 0.36
France 4.31 79.80 4.01 0.48 4.21 0.78
Germany 3.93 2.06 67.81 0.32 2.17 0.50
Greece 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02
Hong Kong 1.86 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.61 0.21 0.40
Hungary 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
Indonesia 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ireland 0.28 0.65 0.91 0.12 0.42 0.20
Israel 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.02
Italy 1.93 0.96 1.10 0.14 0.83 0.23
Japan 8.26 0.73 0.49 89.50 2.61 1.19 1.08
Korea, Rep. of 0.85 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.34 0.21 0.11
Malaysia 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02
Netherlands 1.68 2.36 2.71 0.25 1.69 0.78
New Zealand 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
Norway 0.25 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.04
Philippines 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Poland 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03
Portugal 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.03
Singapore 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.15 0.06
Spain 1.72 0.99 1.18 0.13 0.93 0.23
Sweden 0.85 0.14 0.24 0.08 0.87 0.17 0.34
Switzerland 1.91 1.07 1.83 0.31 1.39 0.53 1.44
Thailand 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.02
Turkey 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
United Kingdom 8.13 2.58 3.76 1.37 74.73 2.44 4.12
United States 50.65 4.25 5.93 5.75 6.40 89.22 7.82
Venezuela 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
*) observation <0 reflects short positions in securities usually resulting from the sale of securities 
acquired under repurchase agreements.
equity portfolio share invested in countryj
 Sources: CPIS for 2001, WDI (2002) and FIBV, own calculations. 
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Table 3: Countries and Regions 
   
   
South America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile  
Colombia  
Venezuela 
South East Asia 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
 
Northern Europe 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Norway 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
North America 
Canada 
United States 
 
West Asia 
Israel 
Turkey 
 
Oceania 
Australia 
New Zealand 
 
Eastern Europe 
Hungary 
Poland 
 
 
Western Europe 
Austria 
Belgium* 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. Of 
Southern Europe 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
Northern Africa 
Egypt 
 
  *) Belgium refers to Belgium only, excluding Luxemburg. 
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Table 4: Probit Estimates of Missing Values in 2001 
Wj* 0.02
(0.93)
logdistanceij -0.067
(0.66)
samelegorij 0.681
(4.10)***
logdcrediti -0.223
(2.40)**
logdcreditj 0.043
(0.42)
restricti -0.094
(0.93)
restrictj -0.061
(0.68)
hrarij -0.001
(0.03)
rcorrij -0.186
(0.64)
gdpgrowthj -1.405
(0.2)
bankcrisisi -0.523
(3.26)***
bankcrisisj -0.095
(0.56)
constant 2.049
(1.78)*
# obs. 433
adj. R2 0.08
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if there exists a missing value and equal to zero if there is a zero value 
in 2001; Probit estimation.  Absolute values of t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
1997 2001
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wij
act 900 0.36 1.25 0.00 18.86 899 0.71 2.58 -0.34 43.12
Wj* 900 2.60 8.06 0.05 48.63 899 3.48 9.75 0.04 50.65
Wj
float 900 2.68 9.63 0.02 58.32 899 3.66 11.69 0.02 60.74
logdistanceij 900 8.56 1.06 5.16 9.90 899 8.45 1.10 5.16 9.90
adjacencyij 900 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 899 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
samelegorij 900 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 899 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
languageij 900 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 899 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
logdcrediti 900 4.35 0.57 2.66 5.26 899 4.43 0.60 2.48 5.23
logdcreditj 900 4.24 0.66 2.66 5.26 899 4.42 0.62 3.02 5.23
restricti 900 0.35 0.73 0.00 3.00 899 0.43 0.70 0.00 2.00
restrictj 900 0.61 0.95 0.00 3.00 899 0.44 0.72 0.00 2.00
hrarij 900 0.02 0.46 -1.79 1.79 899 -0.01 0.28 -0.76 0.76
rcorrij 900 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.21 899 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.07
gdpgrowthij 900 1.39 2.39 -7.39 8.54 899 1.20 2.29 -7.39 5.85
bankcrisisi 900 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 899 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
bankcrisisj 900 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 899 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
 Note: Wijact and Wj* are measured in percent. 
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Table 6: Main Regression Results  
1997 2001
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Wj* 0.092 0.092 0.165 0.159
(14.27)*** (14.17)*** (14.36)*** (14.02)***
Wj
float 0.074 0.135
(14.00)*** (14.32)***
logdistanceij -0.303 -0.304 -0.285 -0.534 -0.533 -0.719
(5.31)*** (5.32)*** (4.35)*** (5.74)*** (5.73)*** (5.76)***
samelegorij 0.499 0.494 0.493 0.771 0.763 1.064
(5.53)*** (5.45)*** (5.37)*** (4.39)*** (4.35)*** (4.15)***
logdcrediti 0.439 0.44 0.441 0.050 0.045 0.217
(3.29)*** (3.29)*** (3.18)*** (0.22) (0.2) (0.82)
logdcreditj 0.337 0.344 0.352 0.440 0.501 0.215
(3.05)*** (3.10)*** (2.94)*** (1.95)* (2.23)** (0.8)
restricti 0.128 0.128 0.119 -0.175 -0.175 -0.486
(1.04) (1.04) (0.84) (1.02) (1.02) (1.87)*
restrictj 0.094 0.096 0.015 -0.026 -0.028 0.117
(0.96) (0.98) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.4)
hrarij 0.488 0.486 1.578 -2.395 -2.519 16.588
(2.71)*** (2.69)*** (0.82) (6.55)*** (6.87)*** (2.85)***
rcorrij 1.696 1.669 15.239 24.967 27.618 -201.802
(0.84) (0.82) (0.3) (1.71)* (1.89)* (1.13)
gdpgrowthj -0.031 -0.034 -0.026 0.151 0.157 0.174
(0.88) (1.37) (1.02) (2.83)*** (2.93)*** (2.35)**
bankcrisisi -1.231 -1.228 -1.269 -0.723 -0.731 -0.963
(4.68)*** (4.65)*** (3.04)*** (2.21)** (2.24)** (1.91)*
bankcrisisj 0.033 0.098 0.235 0.215 0.343 0.696
(0.22) (0.65) (1.03) (0.67) (1.08) (1.38)
hrar*logdistanceij 0.610
(2.17)**
harar*samelegorij -1.998
(3.54)***
hrar*logdcreditj -4.191
(4.48)***
hrar*gdpgrowthj 0.314
(1.92)*
rcorr*logdistanceij 20.998
(1.81)*
rcorr*gdpgrowthj -10.865
(2.11)**
# obs. 900 900 900 899 899 899
adjm. factor 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.54
adj. R2 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.14
Notes: Dependent variable for all specifications: Wijact; Tobit estimation of a corner solution model.  Absolute 
values of t statistics are reported in parentheses. Region dummies for the country of origin and the country of 
destination as well as a constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 7: World and Float Portfolio for Different Regions 
1997 2001 1997 2001
(5) (5) (6) (6)
Wj* 0.124 0.259 Wj
float 0.1 -0.52
(11.71)*** (15.85)*** (11.37)*** (6.58)***
(Wj
*) * samerica -0.103 -0.200 Wj
float * samerica -0.085 -0.166
(6.84)*** (9.06)*** (6.75)*** (9.00)***
(Wj
*) * namerica 0.050 0.013 Wj
float * namerica 0.045 0.017
(2.36)** (0.34) (2.51)** (0.54)
(Wj
*) * easia -0.041 -0.182 Wj
float * easia -0.033 -0.149
(1.87)* (7.15)*** (1.79)* (7.02)***
(Wj
*) * seasia -0.102 -0.191 Wj
float * seasia -0.084 -0.158
(7.05)*** (8.14)*** (6.94)*** (8.08)***
(Wj
*) * wasia -0.071 -0.179 Wj
float * wasia -0.06 -0.147
(3.26)*** (5.73)*** (3.23)*** (5.69)***
(Wj
*) * seurope -0.060 -0.173 Wj
float * seurope -0.050 -0.143
(4.09)*** (7.48)*** (4.03)*** (7.42)***
(Wj
*) * neurope 0.026 0.080 Wj
float * neurope 0.022 0.068
(2.07)** (3.69)*** (2.07)** (3.74)***
(Wj
*) * oceania -0.007 0.026 Wj
float * oceania -0.005 0.025
(0.43) (0.89) (0.37) (-1.00)
(Wj
*) * eeurope -0.194 Wj
float * eeurope -0.161
(6.60)*** (6.60)***
(Wj
*) * nafrica -0.190 Wj
float * nafrica -0.156
(4.64)*** (4.61)***
logdistanceij -0.320 -0.520 logdistanceij -0.319 -0.522
(6.31)*** (6.58)*** (6.26)*** (6.60)***
samelegorij 0.435 0.598 samelegorij 0.43 0.586
(5.36)*** (4.00)*** (5.27)*** (3.91)***
logdcrediti 0.412 -0.004 logdcrediti 0.414 -0.012
(3.52)*** (0.02) (3.52)*** (0.06)
logdcreditj 0.311 0.338 logdcreditj 0.316 0.408
(3.19)*** (1.79)* (3.23)*** (2.16)**
restricti 0.073 -0.215 restricti 0.077 -0.217
(0.7) (1.49) (0.73) (1.5)
restrictj 0.072 -0.004 restrictj 0.073 -0.007
(0.83) (0.03) (0.84) (0.04)
hrarij 0.393 -2.09 hrarij 0.382 -2.266
(2.48)** (6.77)*** (2.40)** (7.33)***
rcorrij -0.950 7.342 rcorrij -0.868 10.279
(0.52) (0.6) (0.48) (0.84)
gdpgrowthj -0.027 0.111 gdpgrowthj -0.030 0.119
(1.26) (2.48)** (1.39) (2.66)***
bankcrisisi -1.029 -0.728 bankcrisisi -1.035 -0.73
(4.50)*** (2.66)*** (4.50)*** (2.66)***
bankcrisisj 0.015 0.147 bankcrisisj 0.084 0.284
(0.11) (0.55) (0.64) (1.06)
# obs. 900 899 # obs. 900 899
adjm. factor 0.5 0.55 adjm. factor 0.5 0.55
adj. R2 0.27 0.19 adj. R2 0.27 0.19
Notes: see Table 7. 
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Table 8: World and Float Portfolio for the U.S. and Country Pairs of the EMU  
1997 2001 1997 2001
(7) (7) (8) (8)
Wj* 0.092 0.162 Wj
float 0.074 0.133
(14.24)*** (14.15)*** (13.99)*** (14.15)***
(Wj
*) * U.S. -0.026 -0.162 Wj
float * U.S. -0.015 -0.133
(0.34) (0.97) (0.19) (0.77)
(Wj
*) * EMU 0.094 0.283 Wj
float * EMU 0.137 0.391
(1.16) (2.31)** (-1.30) (2.48)**
logdistanceij -0.288 -0.493 logdistanceij -0.287 -0.488
(4.94)*** (5.23)*** (4.91)*** (5.18)***
samelegorij 0.492 0.744 samelegorij 0.485 0.733
(5.44)*** (4.25)*** (5.33)*** (4.18)***
logdcrediti 0.445 0.094 logdcrediti 0.444 0.085
(3.33)*** (0.41) (3.32)*** (0.37)
logdcreditj 0.341 0.457 logdcreditj 0.347 0.517
(3.08)*** (2.03)** (3.13)*** (2.31)**
restricti 0.125 -0.183 restricti 0.126 -0.184
(1.03) (1.07) (1.03) (1.07)
restrictj 0.09 -0.011 restrictj 0.092 -0.011
(0.92) (0.06) (0.94) (0.06)
hrarij 0.472 -2.273 hrarij 0.469 -2.371
(2.62)*** (6.12)*** (2.59)*** (6.37)***
rcorrij 1.813 20.792 rcorrij 1.79 23.011
(0.89) (1.42) (0.88) (1.57)
gdpgrowthj -0.031 0.138 gdpgrowthij -0.034 0.142
(1.24) (2.59)*** (1.35) (2.66)***
bankcrisisi -1.227 -0.694 bankcrisisi -1.224 -0.703
(4.67)*** (2.13)** (4.65)*** (2.16)**
bankcrisisj 0.034 0.221 bankcrisisj 0.084 0.341
(0.23) (0.69) (0.65) (1.08)
# obs. 900 899 # obs. 900 899
adjm. factor 0.5 0.54 adjm. factor 0.5 0.54
adj. R2 0.22 0.13 adj. R2 0.22 0.13
Notes: see Table 7. 
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Table 9: Basic Regression Results for Within-EMU Investments Only 
1997 1997 2001 2001
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Wj* 0.363 0.728
(5.27)*** (5.42)***
Wj
float 0.471 0.951
(5.29)*** (5.53)***
logdistanceij -0.317 -0.324 -1.439 -1.441
(2.41)** (2.47)** (4.91)*** (4.95)***
samelegorij 0.11 0.09 0.449 0.44
(0.73) (0.6) (1.32) (1.3)
logdcrediti 0.077 0.091 -1.135 -1.141
(0.23) (0.27) (1.84)* (1.86)*
logdcreditj 0.669 0.713 0.239 0.261
(1.97)* (2.11)** (0.39) (0.43)
hrarij 0.731 0.718 -2.159 -2.159
(3.56)*** (3.50)*** (3.76)*** (3.78)***
rcorrij -20.131 -19.867 -88.836 -87.588
(0.72) (0.71) (2.20)** (2.18)**
gdpgrowthj -0.018 -0.026 0.191 0.193
(0.37) (0.55) (1.59) (1.61)
# obs. 81 81 108 108
adj. factor 0.73 0.73 0.7 0.7
adj. R2 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.16
LR-Test: W*=1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.77
Notes: Dependent variable for all specifications: Wijact; Tobit estimation of a corner solution model.  Absolute 
values of t statistics are reported in parentheses.  A constant are included but not reported. 
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Appendix
A Calculation of Optimal and Actual Portfolio
Shares
The actual portfolio share, W actij,t , can be calculated as foreign equity holdings of
country i in country j, equaij,t, relative to country i’s total holdings of foreign as
well as domestic equities, equatoti,t =
∑N
i=1 equaij,t:
W actij,t =
equaij,t
equatoti,t
(1)
As equatoti,t is not directly available from the CPIS data,
40 country i’s total
equity holdings are calculated as follows:
equatoti,t = MCAPi,t −
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
equaji,t +
N∑
i=1,i6=j
equaij,t (2)
where
∑N
j=1,j 6=i equaji,t denotes all foreign assets of country i held in the rest
of the world and
∑N
i=1,i6=j equaij,t the sum of all equity assets of the rest of the
world held in country i.
B Robustness Checks
Additional estimates employing different econometric techniques and using alter-
native proxies for frictions are undertaken in order to underline the robustness of
the results presented in Section 5.
Specifications (1) and (2) are estimated with OLS for positive values given the
data problems of reported zero investments for 1997 (see Section 4). Regression
results in Table 11, first two columns, show that for positive foreign portfolio
shares estimated coefficients look very much like the ones in the Tobit model
except for interaction effects. Results are stable towards the choice of estimation
methods. Partial effects, however, are different and nonlinear in the Tobit model
and on average only half as large as in the OLS case. The Tobit model is preferred
because nonlinearities are very likely for small foreign portfolio shares.
40The data includes only foreign equity securities and no domestic securities, equaii,t.
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In order to further investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to the
reported zero problem for the 1997 sample, an alternative sample is estimated
for 1997 where a missing value is imputed for a zero entry whenever a missing is
present for 2001. Descriptive statistics for this sample are summarized in Table
10. Compared to the sample employed before, the average value of actual foreign
portfolio shares is larger due to a larger number of missing values instead of zeros.
Regression results for specifications (1) and (2), (Table 11, last two columns) are
not very sensitive towards these changes in the sample. Coefficients are very close
to the ones described in Section 5.
In Tables 12 and 13 several proxies of capital market frictions are exchanged
by others in order to test the validity of the proxies. First, in specification (9) a
dummy variable equal to one if both countries share the same language or colonial
background, languageij,t, is used instead of the dummy variable for both coun-
tries sharing the same legal origin. Both variables proxy information advantages
(see Section 2.1). Second, instead of logdistanceij,t a dummy variable for both
countries sharing a common border, adjacencyij,t, is used in specification (10)
in order to proxy information advantages due to proximity. Third, as a further
alternative measure for distance a dummy variable equal to one if a country pair
is part of the same region is employed [specification (11)]. Again the regional
subdivision of Table 3 applies. Fourth, it is argued in the paper that financial
market development proxied by logdcrediti,t is likely to have a positive impact on
foreign portfolio shares. However, the effect might also be opposite: Too much
bank financing at home may indicate an unsatisfied demand for listed stocks
that is resolved by going abroad. This issue is considered by controlling for the
size of the home stock market adding the ratio of market capitalization in the
home country relative to GDP, mcap/GDPi,t, as an explaining variable [specifi-
cation (12)]. Regression results of specifications (9) to (12) demonstrate that the
proxies used for the main regressions are very robust: Significance levels do not
change and the size of coefficients is very stable. The effect of logdcrediti,t is not
influenced by controlling for the size of the home stock market, mcap/GDPi,t.
Finally, different subsamples excluding major financial centers are estimated
in order to check whether these have a strong impact on the size of the coefficients
(Tables 14 and 15). When observations of EMU country pairs are excluded from
the sample, almost the same coefficients as in the complete sample regressions
are obtained except for some minor changes in magnitude. Similarly, results are
stable but coefficients are slightly smaller when the U.S. is excluded from the
sample. This can also be observed when the U.K. is not part of the sample.
Coefficients are even less affected if Japan is excluded. Overall, the exclusion of
important financial centers leads to only marginally different results.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics 
1997
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wij
act 795 0.41 1.32 0.00 18.86
Wj* 795 2.79 8.38 0.05 48.63
Wj
float 795 2.89 10.01 0.02 58.32
logdistanceij 795 8.50 1.08 5.16 9.90
adjacencyij 795 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
samelegorij 795 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
languageij 795 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
logdcrediti 795 4.42 0.50 2.66 5.26
logdcreditj 795 4.28 0.65 2.66 5.26
restricti 795 0.27 0.71 0.00 3.00
restrictj 795 0.56 0.93 0.00 3.00
hrarij 795 0.02 0.46 -1.79 1.79
rcorrij 795 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.21
gdpgrowthj 795 1.39 2.39 -7.39 8.54
bankcrisisi 795 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
bankcrisisj 795 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Note: Wijact and Wj* are measured in percent. 
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Table 11: Basic Regression Results, Robustness Checks 
1997 1997 2001 2001 1997 1997
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Wj* 0.094 0.155 0.095
(5.48)*** (5.48)*** (14.52)***
Wj
float 0.076 0.127 0.077
(5.38)*** (5.40)*** (14.26)***
logdistanceij -0.261 -0.262 -0.474 -0.473 -0.293 -0.294
(3.27)*** (3.27)*** (4.63)*** (4.62)*** (5.03)*** (5.04)***
samelegorij 0.434 0.427 0.773 0.767 0.484 0.479
(2.89)*** (2.85)*** (2.62)*** (2.60)*** (5.23)*** (5.15)***
logdcrediti 0.216 0.216 0.062 0.058 0.232 0.232
(2.06)** (2.04)** (0.32) (0.30) (1.63) (1.62)
logdcreditj 0.306 0.313 0.446 0.503 0.305 0.312
(3.13)*** (3.17)*** (3.04)*** (3.41)*** (2.69)*** (2.73)***
restricti 0.013 0.011 -0.211 -0.212 0.196 0.196
(0.08) (0.08) (1.49) (1.49) (1.59) (1.59)
restrictj 0.059 0.06 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.064
(1.27) (1.28) (0.52) (0.48) (0.62) (0.63)
hrarij 0.399 0.399 -2.512 -2.629 0.322 0.32
(2.49)** (2.45)** (3.89)*** (3.99)*** (1.73)* (1.71)*
rcorrij 1.467 1.437 18.891 21.573 1.156 1.114
(0.72) (0.7) (2.04)** (2.32)** (0.53) (0.51)
gdpgrowthj -0.026 -0.731 0.133 0.139 -0.023 -0.026
(2.12)** (2.43)** (4.46)*** (4.55)*** (0.89) (1.01)
bankcrisisi -0.739 -0.731 -0.272 -0.275 -1.153 -1.149
(2.44)** (2.43)** (1.1) (1.11) (4.21)*** (4.18)***
bankcrisisj 0.038 0.104 0.295 0.417 0.043 0.11
(0.48) (1.32) (1.77)* (2.53)** (0.28) (0.72)
# obs. 707 707 796 796 795 795
adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.4 0.56 0.56
adjm. factor 0.19 0.18
 
Note: Dependent variable for all specifications: Wijact; The first four columns refer to OLS estimations of 
positive foreign portfolio shares. The last two columns refer to Tobit estimations of a corner solution model for 
an alternative sample (see Section 4 and 5). Absolute values of t statistics are reported in parentheses.  Region 
dummies for the country of origin and the country of destination as well as a constant are included but not 
reported.  
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Table 12: Basic Regression Results, Robustness Checks 
1997 2001 1997 2001
(9) (9) (10) (10)
Wj* 0.093 0.166 0.093 0.164
(14.52)*** (14.46)*** (14.50)*** (14.30)***
logdistanceij -0.294 -0.517
(5.20)*** (5.54)***
adjacencyij 1.143 1.908
(6.26)*** (5.57)***
samelegorij 0.454 0.73
(5.02)*** (4.12)***
languageij 0.776 1.078
(6.46)*** (4.68)***
logdcrediti 0.375 0.00 0.430 -0.060
(2.81)*** (0.00) (3.26)*** (0.26)
logdcreditj 0.262 0.407 0.289 0.449
(2.37)** (1.80)* (2.64)*** (1.99)**
restricti 0.176 -0.140 0.132 -0.137
(1.42) (0.81) (1.09) (0.8)
restrictj 0.094 0.006 0.086 0.01
(0.96) (0.03) (0.88) (0.05)
hrarij 0.456 -2.364 0.446 -2.384
(2.55)** (6.47)*** (2.50)** (6.53)***
rcorrij 2.046 25.007 4.187 22.282
(1.01) (1.72)* (2.34)** (1.53)
gdpgrowthj -0.039 0.14 -0.024 0.142
(1.59) (2.63)*** (0.99) (2.68)***
bankcrisisi -1.086 -0.615 -1.268 -0.857
(4.14)*** (1.87)* (4.88)*** (2.62)***
bankcrisisj 0.200 0.304 -0.012 0.170
(1.32) (0.95) (0.08) (0.53)
# obs. 900 899 900 899
adjm. factor 0.5 0.54 0.5 0.54
adj. R2 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.12
 
Notes: see Table 7. 
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Table 13: Basic Regression Results, Robustness Checks 
1997 2001 1997 2001
(11) (11) (12) (12)
Wj* 0.092 0.164 0.092 0.164
(14.14)*** (14.18)*** (14.25)*** (14.40)***
logdistanceij -0.302 -0.538
(5.30)*** (5.81)***
sameregionij 0.619 1.063
(3.95)*** (3.66)***
samelegorij 0.547 0.866 0.498 0.796
(6.07)*** (4.91)*** (5.50)*** (4.55)***
logdcrediti 0.425 0.007 0.392 0.229
(3.17)*** (0.03) (2.50)** -0.95
mcap/GDPi 0.087 -0.406
(0.56) (2.55)**
logdcreditj 0.341 0.455 0.339 0.458
(3.06)*** (2.00)** (3.06)*** (2.04)**
restricti 0.126 -0.154 0.114 -0.195
(1.02) (0.88) (0.91) (1.13)
restrictj 0.092 -0.01 0.100 -0.022
(0.93) (0.06) (1.01) (0.12)
hrarij 0.498 -2.369 0.516 -2.287
(2.75)*** (6.41)*** (2.76)*** (6.24)***
rcorrij 4.253 22.654 1.726 32.82
(2.25)** (1.54) (0.85) (2.21)**
gdpgrowthj -0.034 0.138 -0.032 0.158
(1.34) (2.56)** (1.3) (2.97)***
bankcrisisi -1.257 -0.765 -1.156 -0.949
(4.74)*** (2.31)** (3.91)*** (2.81)***
bankcrisisj 0.043 0.227 0.032 0.229
(0.29) (0.7) (0.21) (0.72)
# obs. 900 899 900 899
adjm. factor 0.5 0.55 0.5 0.54
adj. R2 0.21 0.12 0.22 0.13
 
Notes: see Table 7. 
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Table 14: Basic Regression Results: Subsamples 
1997 2001 1997 2001
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Wj* 0.092 0.161 0.085 0.155
(13.84)*** (14.87)*** (15.37)*** (15.13)***
logdistanceij -0.313 -0.444 -0.261 -0.436
(5.08)*** (4.88)*** (5.37)*** (5.28)***
samelegorij 0.529 0.691 0.386 0.672
(5.44)*** (4.08)*** (4.91)*** (4.35)***
logdcrediti 0.443 0.119 0.417 0.145
(3.22)*** (0.54) (3.40)*** (0.71)
logdcreditj 0.294 0.242 0.183 0.201
(2.55)** (1.34) (1.91)* (1.20)
restricti 0.169 -0.182 0.075 -0.15
(1.35) (1.16) (0.72) (1.02)
restrictj 0.064 -0.011 0.096 -0.023
(0.62) (0.08) (1.15) (0.17)
hrarij 0.297 -1.757 0.448 -1.668
(1.47) (4.72)*** (2.91)*** (5.39)***
rcorrij 1.915 14.224 1.747 14.263
(0.92) (1.12) (1.03) (-1.24)
gdpgrowthj -0.03 0.105 -0.032 0.109
(1.11) (2.19)** (1.52) (2.48)**
bankcrisisi -1.274 -0.684 -1.018 -0.551
(4.74)*** (2.28)** (4.60)*** (1.95)*
bankcrisisj 0.090 -0.011 0.087 -0.038
(0.6) (0.04) (0.70) (0.14)
# obs. 843 916 863 955
adjm. factor 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.52
adj. R2 0.22 0.12 0.26 0.13
excl. EMU country pairs excl. US
 
Notes: see Table 7. 
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Table 15: Basic Regression Results, Subsamples 
1997 2001 1997 2001
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Wj* 0.085 0.155 0.091 0.167
(15.37)*** (15.13)*** (13.44)*** (14.77)***
logdistanceij -0.261 -0.436 -0.321 -0.548
(5.37)*** (5.28)*** (5.47)*** (6.03)***
samelegorij 0.386 0.672 0.528 0.829
(4.91)*** (4.35)*** (5.65)*** (4.96)***
logdcrediti 0.417 0.145 0.417 -0.115
(3.40)*** -0.71 (3.07)*** (0.50)
logdcreditj 0.183 0.201 0.347 0.288
(1.91)* (1.29) (3.03)*** (1.53)
restricti 0.075 -0.150 0.119 -0.076
(0.72) (1.02) (0.96) (0.45)
restrictj 0.096 -0.023 0.120 -0.037
(1.15) (0.17) (1.16) (0.24)
hrarij 0.448 -1.668 0.571 -2.150
(2.91)*** (5.39)*** (3.02)*** (6.24)***
rcorrij 1.747 14.263 1.659 11.128
(1.03) (1.24) (0.81) (0.85)
gdpgrowthj -0.032 0.109 -0.037 0.127
(1.52) (2.48)** (1.41) (2.61)***
bankcrisisi -1.018 -0.551 -1.231 -0.962
(4.60)*** (1.95)* (4.56)*** (2.94)***
bankcrisisj 0.087 -0.038 -0.028 0.076
(0.70) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24)
# obs. 863 955 863 955
adjm. factor 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.53
adj. R2 0.26 0.13 0.22 0.13
excl. UK excl. Japan
 
Notes: see Table 7. 
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C Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Variable Description
Wij
act actual portfolio holdings of country i in country j
Sources: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF; 
International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV), WDI (2002) 
and own calculations (see Appendix A).
Wj* share of country j's to world stock market capitalization ("market portfolio share")
Source: International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV), WDI (2002).
Wj
float share of country j's to world stock market capitalization that excludes shares by 
controlling shareholders ("float portfolio share")
Source: Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) for 1997, 
the ratio of W j
*  and W j
float in 1997 is used to impute the values for 2001.
logdistanceij logarithm of physical distance between country i's and j's capitals
adjacencyij dummy equal to one if two countries share a common border
languageij dummy equal to one if two countries share a common language or colonial past
Source: Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) 
(www.nber.org/~wei/data\fsw1995\fsw1995.zip), updated with information by 
the original data source, CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/).
sameregionij dummy equal to one if two countries are part of the same region
Source: see UN regional classification in Table 4.
samelegorij dummy equal to one if both countries share a common legal origin
Source: La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney (1998).
logdcrediti/j log of domestic credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP
Source: WDI (2002).
restricti/j financial integration index, sum of index equal to one if (i) multiple exchange rates, 
(ii) capital account restrictions, or (iii) current account restrictions are in place, where
(iii) is only added if (ii) exists.**
Source: calculated using an update of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) indices.
hrarij historical risk adjusted excess returns (calculated as monthly returns in country j minus 
monthly returns in country i over the standard deviation of this return difference for
the period end Sept. 1996 - end Sept. 1997 and end Sept. 2000 - end Sept. 2001.)
rcorrij return correlations of country i's and country j's monthly stock market indices calcu-
lated for end Sept. 1996 - end Sept. 1997 and end Sept. 2000 - end Sept. 2001.)
Source: standard national stock market indices by MSCI (www.msci.com).
*) I would to thank Axel Dreher for sharing his update. 
**) Restrictions on current account have been included because current account transactions can be used 
to (partially) evade restrictions on capital transactions (if these are in place).
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